IMPEACHMENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL: FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE REMOVAL OF UNWANTED ELLECTED OFFICERS

Abstract

This article aims to portray the political use of the impeachment using the concept of constitutional hardball. The terminology refers to the tangent between licit and illicit practices whose objective is to disguise unconstitutional purposes through the use of instruments provided by law, hiding the harmful potential these practices to the stability of democracy and political institutions. The research uses an exploratory method, approaching bibliography and elements of the impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff. The article is structured in three parts: the need for oversight in the rule of law and the balance between powers, portraying impeachment as a mechanism of this control that can be used in an abusive way; the contours of the impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff and the narrative dispute regarding the suitability of the adopted mechanism, between alleged legality and accusations of “soft coup”; finally, the use of the concept of constitutional hardball as an alternative capable of explaining the political use of a legal-political instrument that leads to the dismissal of elective mandates. It concludes that, despite the legal grounds of impeachment and the procedural guarantees applied, Dilma Rousseff was removed from office for political reasons, which configures the practice of constitutional hardball. The stability of the democratic political system depends on overcoming the use of impeachment as a political weapon.